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The study examined maize farmers’ participation in the formal financial market and its impact on farm size and expenditure on
variable farm inputs. A multistage sampling method was used in selecting 595 maize farmers from the seven districts in Ashanti
and Brong Ahafo Regions of Ghana. A structured questionnaire and interview schedule were used to elicit information from the
respondents. The impact of formal financial market participation on farm size and expenditure on variable inputs was estimated
using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method. The results of the study showed that formal financial market participation has
the potential to significantly increase expenditure on variable inputs by farmers and consequently use of improved technology.
Therefore, formal financial market participation should be encouraged through education and promotional activities.
1. Introduction
The formal financial sector has been identified as important
in improvingproductivityby making financial services avail-
able to producers in the agricultural sector. This is because
informal financial services are often considered to be unsat-
isfactory because of extraordinarily high interest rates on
credit,andsavingsarenotsufficientlysecure[1].Itistherefore
assumed that participation in the formal financial market
would lead to larger farm sizes and adoption of improved
technologythroughincreasedexpenditureonvariableinputs.
Inviewofthis,severalpolicieshavebeenadoptedbysuc-
cessive governments of Ghana to improve access to financial
services. These policies include liberalisation of the financial
sectortoincreaseprivatesectorparticipationintheprovision
of financial services. The sector has now expanded from the
prereform period of two foreign banks and two state owned
banks with virtually no nonbank financial institutions, to
includemanyprivatefinancialinstitutions.Thequestionthen
is: has the expansion in the formal financial sector increased
participation of farmers in the market, and if so what impact
does a farmer’s participation in formal financial market have
on their input usage and farm size? This paper empirically
examines the impact of formalfinancial market participation
on farm size and expenditure on farm inputs by maize
farmers in two regions of Ghana (Ashanti and Brong Ahafo).
The literature on impact evaluation methods is extensive.
Someauthors[2–4]presentveryusefuloverviews.Khandker
et al. [5] have also discussed in detail different methods that
are applicable for impact evaluation and the data needed for
each type. In their methodological review, they stress the
need to address the fundamental question of the missing
counterfactual data in impact evaluation, such as assessing
impact of financial services on performance indicators in a
nonexperimental context.
A cross-sectional data from an observational study [5]
discussed the use of the propensity score matching (PSM)
a p p r o a c ha n dp o i n t e do u tt h a tt h i sm e t h o dc a nb eu s e d
under the conditional independence assumption and com-
mon support assumption [5]. The main thrust of these
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assumptions is that all factors influencing participation are
observable, and individuals with similar characteristics have
an equal chance of belonging to either group (participants
and nonparticipants).
Owusu and Abdulai [6] used the PSM approach to
evaluate the impact of nonfarm income on food security and
poverty in rural Ghana. The authors argue that participation
in nonfarm activities requires a decision by the individual,
which is influenced by certain individual observable factors
which place them in either group. A related study [7] exam-
inedtheimpactofmaizevarietiesonfarmoutputandincome
levels in Mexico. In both studies, the basis for the use of PSM
isthatthefactorswhichinfluenceselectionintoparticipation
(adoption) and nonparticipation (nonadoption) groups are
a s s u m e dt ob eo b s e rv a b l e .
Mutua and Oyugi [8] have evaluated access to financial
services and poverty reduction in rural Kenya using propen-
sity score matching. The study looked at the role access to
financial services could play in addressing poverty and its
related problems, especially in rural areas. They observed a
strong link between access to finance and poverty reduction.
A policy implication arrived at from their study was that
a legal and regulatory framework which takes into account
the banking needs of the poor should be formulated. Owuor
[9] has empirically examined the impact of microfinance on
smallholderfarmersinKenyausingPSM.Heusedmultistage
sampling to identify respondents. Over all, 440 farmers
were interviewed in a cross-sectional survey. His findings
revealed that smallholders’ participation in micro-finance
credit (MFC) improved their incomes by a range of between
US$200toUS$260perhectareinasingleproductionperiod.
2. Methodology
2.1. Sampling and Data Collection. Multistage sampling was
conducted to select 2 regions, 7 districts, and 595 farmers
for the study. Selection of the regions and districts (first and
secondstage)wasguidedbythelevelofagriculturalactivities
andthelevelofmaizeproductionusingofficialstatisticsfrom
t h eM i n i s t ryo fF o o da n dA g r i c u l t u r e( M o F A )[ 10].
In Ashanti Region, districts whose maize production
output in 2008 exceeded 20,000 metric tonnes were selected,
w h i l ei nB r o n gA h a f oR e g i o n ,t h e5d i s t r i c t sw h i c hh a da
minimum of 27,000 metric tonnes each of maize output in
2008 were selected for the study. A third stage of sampling
involved identifying and listing maize farmers in the opera-
tional areas of the extension agents. Selection of respondents
wasguidedbytheirinvolvementinmaizeproduction.Atotal
of595maizefarmersfromthestudyareaweresampledforthe
study.
A questionnaire was administered to the sampled farm-
ers. The survey questionnaire contained detailed sections
on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the
farmers,householdcharacteristics,variableinputusage,farm
size, and formal financial market participation.
2.2. Theoretical and Analytical Framework. Formal financial
marketparticipationisconsideredintermsofusage ofanyof
the formal financial services or combination of these services
by the respondents. Respondents are considered financial
market participants if they responded yes to the question
“ h a v ey o uu s e da n yfi n a n c i a ls e r v i c e sw i t h i nt h ef o r m a l
financial market segment?” We adopted and modified a
methodused by [7]t oeval ua t eth eim pacto ff o rm alfin a n cial
market participation on farm size and expenditure and on
variable inputs as a proxy for technology adoption.
Becerril and Abdulai [7] employed PSM to evaluate the
marginal impact of improved maize varieties on poverty in
Mexico. Rosenbaum and Rubin [11] pioneered this method
followed by many other improvements and applications in
works by [12–14]. Propensity Score is defined as the con-
ditional probability of participation given preparticipation
characteristics. The main basis for the use of PSM is that
participationandnonparticipationdecisionsmaynotberan-
dom but rather selective and depending on preparticipation
variables: the estimation of the effect of participation may
be biased by the existence of selectivity bias or confounding
factors. For example, in order to evaluate the impact of
financial market participation on farm size and expenditure
on variable input, it is necessary to draw a counterfactual
scenario about the productivity variables of farmers who
participated in the formal financial market. This group of
respondents is referred to as the treated group of farmers.
Th ec o u n t e r f a c t u a lw o u l dt h e nb ec o m p a r e dw i t hf a r ms i z e
and expenditure on variable inputs of the treated (those who
participated in formal financial market) in order to evaluate
the impact of formal financial market participation on farm
size and expenditure on variable inputs. For the treated, their
counterfactualisthefarmsizeandexpendituretheyincurred
onvariableinputswhentheydidnotparticipateintheformal
financial market segment. While for the untreated (farmers
who did not participate in formal financial market) their
counterfactual is their farm size and expenditure on variable
input when they participate in the formal financial market
segment. If we use 𝜑 to represent the impact of financial
market participation on one of the outcome variables say
farm size, then
𝜑=𝑌 1 −𝑌 0, (1)
where 𝑌1 and 𝑌0 denote farm sizes of the respondents when
they participated in the financial market and the counter-
factual, respectively. The average treatment effect (ATE) of
financial market participation can be calculated as
ATE =𝐸(𝗿) =𝐸( 𝑌 1 −𝑌 0), (2)
where 𝐸(⋅) represents the average or expected farm size.
The impact of treatment on farm size of the farmers who
participatedinthefinancialmarket(treated)canbeestimated
as
ATT =𝐸(𝑌1 |𝐷=1 ) −𝐸(𝑌0 |𝐷=1 ), (3)
where ATT represents Average Treatment effect on the
treated and 𝐷 denotes the formal financial market participa-
tion indicator which equals one (1) if the farmer participated
in the formal financial market and zero (0) otherwise. 𝐸(𝑌0 |
𝐷=1 ) i st h em e a nf a r ms i z eo ft r e a t e di na b s e n c eo ft h eISRN Economics 3
treatment, that is, counterfactual farm size. In the case of
nonparticipant (untreated or control) group of farmers, their
a v e r a g ef a r ms i z ec a nb ee s t i m a t e da s
ATU =𝐸( 𝑌 1 −𝑌 0 |𝐷=0 ), (4)
w h e r eA T Ui st h eA v e r a g eT r e a t m e n te ff e c to nt h eu n t r e a t e d .
The estimation of ATT and ATU clearly depends on the
counterfactual levels of farm size of the two groups, treated
and control {𝐸(𝑌0 |𝐷=1 )and (𝑌0 |𝐷=0 ) } ,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,a s
explained above. In nonexperimental studies such as ours, it
isimpossibletoassessthecounterfactualfarmsizesofthetwo
groups of respondent formal financial market participants
(treated) and nonparticipant (untreated or control) groups.
It is possible to use the farm size of nonparticipants as a
counterfactual for participants or the treated. However, this
may lead to a biased estimate of the impact (ATT) as a result
of selection bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) as follows:
Δ=𝐸(𝑌1 |𝐷=1 ) −𝐸(𝑌0 |𝐷=0 ). (5)
Through expansion and rearrangement, we have
Δ=𝐸( 𝑌 1 |𝐷=1 )−𝐸( 𝑌 0 |𝐷=1 )
+𝐸( 𝑌 0 |𝐷=1 )−𝐸( 𝑌 0 |𝐷=0 ),
Δ=ATT +𝐸(𝑌0 |𝐷=1 ) −𝐸(𝑌0 |𝐷=0 ),
Δ=ATT + SB,
ATT =Δ−SB,
(6)
whereSBisselectionbiaswhicharisesasaresultofunobserv-
able characteristics influencing selection of respondents into
treatment and control groups, respectively. If SB =0thenthe
difference between the average observed farm size of treated
and control groups of farmers would be given as
ATT =𝐸(𝑌|𝐷=1 ) − (𝑌|𝐷=0 ). (7)
However if SB is not equal to zero then there exists selection
bias; thus the estimated ATT would not be the difference in
t h ea v e r a g eo b s e r v e df a r ms i z eo ft h et r e a t e da n du n t r e a t e d
(nonparticipants).
It is possible that hard working farmers may be the ones
who participated in formal financial market due to these
institutions’ screening process; thus SB ̸ =0. Hence farmers
who participated in formal financial market may have larger
farmsizeseveniftheydidnotparticipateintheformalfinan-
cialmarketcomparedto nonparticipants.As a result,average
farm size of the untreated group is not a good comparison
for the counterfactuals of the treated group in estimating the
impact of formal financial market participation on farm size.
Therefore, [11] suggested the use of the propensity score
matching approach as a way to correct for the existence
of these confounding factors based on the idea that the
bias is reduced when the comparison is performed using
participants and control group of farmers who are as similar
as possible [5] .Th i sa p p r o a c hi sb a s e do nt h ei d e at h a t
by matching the outcome variables of treated and control
respondents who are similar in observable characteristics,
selection bias would be eliminated.
The PSM method summarizes preparticipation charac-
teristics into a single index known as the propensity score,
which makes matching feasible. The propensity score is a
conditional probability estimator, and any discrete choice
model such as logit or probit can be used as they yield
similarresults[14].Thus,thePSMapproachfollowstwosteps;
fi r s t ,e i t h e rt h el o g i to rp r o b i tm o d e li su s e dt oe s t i m a t et h e
probability (propensity score) of programme participation,
in this case financial market participation, using observable
characteristicswhichinfluenceparticipationinformalfinan-
cial market. In this study the logit model is specified as
𝑃(𝑋) =𝑃(𝐷=1|𝑋 )
=𝐹( 𝗽 1𝑋1 +⋅⋅⋅𝗽 𝑖𝑋𝑖)
=𝐹( 𝑋 𝗽 )
=𝑒
𝑋𝗽,
(8)
where𝐹(⋅)denotesresponseprobabilitywhichstrictlyranges
between zero and one, 𝑋 is a vector of all observable
characteristics (Covariates) which influence formal financial
market participation, and 𝗽 is the parameter of interest to be
estimated.
This model predicts the probability (propensity score)
of formal financial market participation. Given that the
propensity score is a balancing score, the probability of
formal financial market participation conditional on 𝑋 will
lead to distribution of farmers’ covariates 𝑋,s u c ht h a tt h e s e
covariates will be the same for treatment and control groups.
Assuming that all information relevant to formal financial
market participation and farm size are observable, then the
propensity score will produce valid matches which can be
used to estimate impact (ATT) of formal financial market
participation on farm size and expenditure on variable input
at the second stage. This is done by matching the two groups
ofrespondentsonthebasisofthepredictedpropensityscores
as follows:
ATT = {(𝐸(𝑌1 |𝐷=1⋅𝐸(𝑃(𝑋))))
−𝐸( 𝑌 0 |𝐷=1⋅𝐸(𝑃(𝑋)))},
(9)
where 𝐸(𝑃(𝑋)) denote the expectation with respect to the
distribution of the propensity score in the entire population
and 𝐸(𝑌1 | 𝐷 = 1,𝑃(𝑋)), 𝐸(𝑌0 |𝐷=1 )are as defined above
under (3).
Threedifferentmatchingalgorithmswhichinvolvetrade-
offs in terms of bias and efficiency are used to estimate ATT.
These matching estimators are Nearest Neighbour, Radius,
and Kernel Matching methods and are all conditional on
the propensity score. Nearest Neighbour Matching (NNM)
selects the control group with the smallest distance in
propensity score to the treated group (farmers who access
financial services). Generally, this is done with replacement,
and it works well once the distribution of the propensity
scoreofbothgroups(controlandtreated)issimilar.However,4 ISRN Economics
NNMmayleadtopoormatcheswhenthenearestneighbours
are far away.
Radius Matching (RM) or Calliper involves all neigh-
bours with a maximum propensity score distance. This is
normally defined ap r i o r i ,and it corresponds to the common
support assumption. Radius matching also helps to avoid
poor matches which may arise through matching too distant
neighbours [15]. Kernel-Based Matching (KM) was recom-
mended by [16]. This is a nonparametric estimator that in-
cludes all respondents of the underlying sample of control
group and weighs more distant observed characteristics
among both groups (control and treated) down. Hence it
indicates lower variance. Caliendo and Kopenig [14]n o t e d
that poorer matches could be obtained. The Kernel-based
estimator of the ATT describes the mean difference in
outcome while the matched outcome is given by the Kernel-
w e i g h t e da v e r a g eo ft h eo u t c o m eo ft h ec o n t r o lg r o u po f
farmers.
The PSM model works under two assumptions, namely,
the conditional independence assumption and the common
support or the balancing assumption. The conditional inde-
pendence assumption postulates that all the covariates must
beindependentofparticipation.Thismeansthattheselection
offarmersintobothgroups(treatmentandcontrolgroups)is
exclusivelybasedonobservablecovariates𝑋whichinfluence
the propensity score. In this case, farm size and expenditure
on variable inputs of participants (treated) and nonpartic-
ipants (control group) are assumed to be independent of
the treatment, conditional on observable characteristics or
covariates 𝑋, respectively. Thus respondents’ participation
andnonparticipationdecisionisexclusivelybasedonobserv-
able covariate 𝑋. The balancing assumption or the common
support assumption (CSA) postulates that participation is
shapedbypreparticipationcharacteristics.Thus,thisassump-
tion rules out the phenomenon of perfect predictability of
financial market participation (𝐷=1 ) given covariates 𝑋.
Thisensuresthatfarmerswithidenticalobservablecharacter-
istics or covariates (𝑋) have a positive probability of belong-
ing to a particular group [16].
G o o dq u a l i t ym a t c h e sa r et h o s ew h o s ec o v a r i a t e sa r e
conditioned after the estimation of the propensity score and
which are able to balance the distribution of the relevant
variablesbetweenthetreatedandcontrolledrespondents.For
the standardized bias approach proposed by [11], the quality
of matches is assessed by comparing the situation before
and after matching to check if there remain any differences
after conditioning on the propensity score. Sianesi [17]h a s
also recommended an additional assessment of the matching
quality which requires the reestimation of the propensity
score of matched participants and matched nonparticipants.
Thematchingprocedureisexpectedtobalancethecovariates
very well if the pseudo-𝑅
2 after matching is fairly low, while
the probability of the F-statistics is not significantly different
from zero.
Furthermore, following [18] an appropriate control strat-
egyofhiddenbiasistoexaminethesensitivityofsignificance
levels. It is importanttoassess thesensitivityoftheestimated
participating effect because this explained what happens
when there is hidden bias. The symbol 𝑒
𝗾 is used to present
a measure of the degree of departure from a PSM result that
is free from hidden bias [18]. Thus several values of 𝑒
𝗾 are
calculated to test the sensitivity of the significance level. This
test helps to identify the critical impact level at which signifi-
cancewouldbelost.Thisrepresentsthelevelofunobservable
covariate at which the inference about the treatment effect
will be undermined [19]. In this study, the quality of the
ma t c hesiseval ua t edb yusin gthea p p r oac hr eco mmendedb y
[17],andthesensitivityofsignificancelevelswasexaminedby
using a method suggested by [18]. The first step in the PSM
approach is the estimation of the participation model using a
binarychoicemodel.Inthisstudythelogitmodelwasusedto
estimate probability of formal financial market participation
or use of formal financial services.
The empirical model is specified as
PART =𝗽 0 +𝗽 1GEN +𝗽 2YEDU +𝗽 3VALMOUTPU
+𝗽 4OATIV +𝗽 5HSIZ +𝗽 6TASET
+𝗽 7PROXIFA +𝗽 8LenProFOR +𝗽 9FSIZE +𝑒 .
(10)
3. Definition of Variables Used
in the Logit Model
3.1. Dependent Variable: Participation in Formal Financial
Market (PART). A dummy variable is used as the dependent
variable as “use of formal financial services.” This variable
reflects respondent’s use of formal financial services. It is
s p e c i fi e da s1i ft h er e s p o n d e n tp a r t i c i p a t e so ru s e sa n yo f
the services provided by formal financial institutions and 0
otherwise.
3.2. Independent Variables
3.2.1. Gender (GEN). The likelihood of use of saving, credit,
and money transfer services is assumed to be lower among
female farmers. Relatively, female farmers are often poorer
than male farmers. World Bank [20, 21] indicated that
the female gender in the individual, household, and wider
community and national context are affected by financial,
economic, cultural, political, and legal obstacles which affect
their demand for financial services.
Gender classification is important in this type of analysis
because in Ghana as in many African societies, men and
women have different levels of responsibilities and engage in
different economic activities. Even if they engage in the same
economicactivities,itisatvaryingdegreesofoperationwhich
have different implications on their use of financial services.
Thegenderoftherespondentisspecifiedasadummyvariable
which takes the value of 1 if the respondent is male and 0
otherwise.Itishypothesisedthatmalefarmersaremorelikely
to participate in formal financial market compared to female
farmers.ISRN Economics 5
3.2.2. Years of Schooling (YEDU). Respondents who have
attained higher educational levels are expected to have more
exposure to the financial institution’s policies regarding use
of financial services. The higher the educational level is the
more likely the farmer would be able to understand the
needs of the financial institution in terms of requirement
for access to their services. Therefore, it is hypothesized that
education would have a positive relationship with use of
servicesprovidedbyformalfinancialinstitutions.Steiner[22]
found a positive and significant relationship between higher
education and use of formal financial services in Ghana.
In this study we use the number of years of schooling to
represent level of education.
3.2.3. Previous Year’s Maize Income (VALPUT). The value of
maize harvested is an important factor that would determine
a farmer’s use of services provided by formal financial
institutions because this is a major source of their income.
Where the value of maize harvested is low, the farmer has
limited resources to save hence could not participate in the
formal financial market by saving and may not be able to
access credit as most institutions use savings as collateral
for granting loans. Alternatively with a higher income from
maize, a farmer may be able to save and demand credit
therefore is more likely to participate in a formal financial
market. This variable is specified as total value of maize sales
from previous year’s harvest, and it is hypothesised to have a
positive effect on the demand for financial services.
3.2.4. Off-Farm Income Generating Activities (OATIV).
Farmers may engage in off-farm income generating activ-
ities. Some activities require large amounts of capital and
offer higher returns compared to others. In addition, formal
financial institutions develop products which fit the revenue
and expenditure cycles of off-farm income activities which
encourage use of formal financial services. Therefore, use of
formal financial services is assumed to have a positive rela-
tionship with engagement in off-farm income generating ac-
tivities. This variable is specified as a dummy variable which
takes the value of 1 if the farmer has a secondary income
source and 0 otherwise.
3.2.5. Farmer’s Household Size (HSIZ). The size of the house-
holdisassumedtopositivelyinfluencethelikelihoodofusing
formal financial services. This is because larger households
have more household members thus potentially may have
higher consumption expenses which may affect their ability
to save. Levels of saving tend to influence access to credit.
Also larger households may have members who might occa-
sionallybelivingoutsidetheirpermanentresidenceandsend
moneytoorreceivemoneyfromthehousehold.Forexample,
householdsmay havea member inseniorhigh school,whose
fees may be paid through a formal financial institution.
Chen and Chivakul [23]f o u n df a m i l ys i z et ob eas i g n i fi c a n t
variable which influenced credit demand for household in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This variable is measured as the
number of individual household members taken care of by
the respondents. This variable is expected to have a negative
effect on formal financial market participation.
3.2.6. Farmer’s Household Assets (TASET). The value of the
farmer’shouseholdassetsisestimatedasthesumoftheresale
value of household or domestic assets measured in Ghana
Cedis (GH¢). This is used as a proxy for respondent’s wealth
status in line with [24]. It is expected that the higher the
value of the asset is, the more likely farmers will participate
informalfinancialmarketbyusingsavingandcreditfacilities
as these assets can be used as collateral to secure loans which
would support income generation and consequently savings.
Therefore value of household asset is expected to have a
positive effect on participation in formal financial market.
3.2.7. Proximity to Formal Financial Institution (PROXIFA).
F a r m e r sw h ol i v ef a rf r o mfi n a n c i a li n s t i t u t i o n sa r el e s s
likely to contact the financial institution easily for more
information than those who live close by. Thus it is assumed
that a farmer who lives at a distance of less than 2km
(walking distance) to a financial institution is more likely
to use services provided by the institution because of lower
transactions cost. This variable is specified as a dummy and
takes the value of 1 if the farmer perceived the distance to be
far, that is, beyond a walking distance (2Km) to the nearest
formal financial institution and 0 otherwise.
3.2.8. Farmers’ Perception of Operational Modalities of Finan-
cialInstitution(OPMO). Farmerspassthroughdifferentpro-
cesses to use formal financial services which are operational
modalities of the institution. Depending on the institution,
some of these processes can be time consuming and difficult
to understand. Farmers may prefer to use financial services
iftheyperceiveoperationalmodalitiestobesatisfactory.This
variable is specified as a dummy variable which takes a value
1iffa rmerper cei v esa vin gsp r ocessesandlendingprocedures
ascumbersomeorunsatisfactoryand0otherwise.
3.2.9. Farm Size (FSIZE). Farm size is measured in hectares
and used as a proxy for the scale of operation, and it can also
be used by lenders to estimate expected income of the farmer
and therefore earning capacity. Farmers with large farm sizes
are expected to increase the use of formal financial services
as it influences savings and consequently credit.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Participation in Formal Financial Market. The data has
been disaggregated into farmers who participated in formal
financial market only, those who participated in informal
financial market only, and those who participated in both
formal and informal financial market. In all, 41% of the
respondents participated in the formal market segment only
w h i l e1 3 %u s e dt h ei n f o r m a lm a r k e ts e g m e n to n l y .A b o u t
elevenpercentoftherespondentsusedbothmarketsegments
and close to 34% used neither formal nor informal financial
intermediaries (see Table 1).
4.2. Factors Influencing Formal Financial Market Participa-
tion. Theestimatedcoefficientsofthelogitmodel,alongwith
the levels of significance and marginal effects, are presented6 ISRN Economics
Table 1: Financial market participation among the sample.
Institution Frequency Percentage
Formal 243 40.84
Informal 79 13.28
Both formal and informal 70 11.76
None 203 34.12
Total 595 100.00
Source: Survey data.
in Table 2. The likelihood ratio statistics as indicated by chi-
square statistics are highly significant (𝑃 < 0.00001), sug-
gesting that the model has a strong explanatory power. The
logit regression gave 𝑃 value for Hosmer and Lemeshow
goodness-of-fit test as 0.8602 which suggests that the model
fits reasonably well. Given these goodness of fit measures, it
i sc o n c l u d e dt h a tt h el o g i tm o d e lu s e dh a si n t e g r i t ya n di s
appropriate.
The coefficient of education is positive and statistically
significant at 1% level of significance. This implies that
farmers with higher level of education are more likely to
participate in formal financial market. This might be due
t ot h ef a c tt h a tt h e yc a nr e a da n dw r i t eh e n c eu n d e r s t a n d
benefit of using formal financial services and also are able to
follow the procedures of the financial institution required for
use of their services. A unit increase in number of years of
schoolingwouldresultina1.72%increaseinthelikelihoodof
respondentsparticipatingintheformalfinancialmarket.The
p r e v i o u sy e a r ’ sm a i z ei n c o m eh a sap o s i t i v ea n ds i g n i fi c a n t
effect on participation in the formal financial market. This
implies that if farmers earn more from maize production
activities, they are more likely to keep their excess income
with formal financial institution. A cedi increase in maize
income increases the likelihood of using services of a formal
financial institution by 1.83%.
Engagement in off-farm income generating activities
significantly increases the likelihood of respondents par-
ticipating in the formal financial market. This is because
farmers who engage in off-farm income generating activities
tend to generate additional income, which increases their
demandforsavings.Thisimprovestheirsavingsandincreases
their account balance thereby increasing their demand for
credit. Engagement in off-farm income generating activities
increases the probability of using formal financial services
by 11%. A farmer’s total assets also have a positive effect on
their use of formal financial services. This result indicates
that wealthy farmers are more likely to participate in formal
financial market.
The coefficient of a farmer’s perception on proximity
to the nearest formal financial institution is negative and
significant at 1%. The result indicates that farmers who
perceive that the distance between their residence and the
location of the formal financial institution to be too far
are less likely to participate in the formal financial market.
Specifically farmers who perceive the distance to be far are
17.9%lesslikelytouseservicesofformalfinancialinstitutions.
Thismaybeattributedtothefactthattheywouldincurhigher
costs to transact business with the institution.
A sc a nb eo b s e r v e di nT a b l e2, the coefficient of opera-
tional modalities is positive and significant at 1%. Farmers
who perceive operational modalities of formal financial
institutions to be satisfactory are 37% more likely to use their
services compared to their counterparts who perceive the
operational modalities as unsatisfactory.
Farm size is related positively to participation in formal
financial market. The coefficient is statistically significant
at 5% level of significance. Based on the marginal effect, a
h e c t a r ei n c r e a s ei nf a r ms i z ei sl i k e l yt oi n c r e a s ep r o b a b i l i t y
of farmer participating in formal financial market by 12.5%
(Table 2).
4.3. Impact of Formal Financial Market Participation on Farm
Size and Expenditure on Variable Inputs. Nearest Neighbour,
Radius,andKernel-basedmatchingalgorithmswereusedfor
the matching. The results of the propensity score matching
on the impact of formal financial market participation on
farm size and expenditure on variable inputs per hectare are
presented in Table 3. All the matches gave similar results.
The nearest neighbour matching estimate of the impact of
formal financial market participation on farm size recorded
an increase of about 0.11 hectare. However, this increase is
statistically insignificant. In the case of expenditure on vari-
able inputs, farmers who participated in the formal financial
market recorded higher expenditure than nonparticipants
(GHć85.18), and this is significant at the 1% level. In the
caseofcalliperorradiusmatching,weconsideredneighbours
with a calliper of 0.01.
The result shows a 0.99 hectare increase in farm size,
but this is statistically not significant. However, there is a
GHć79.42 increase in expenditure on variable inputs per
hectare as a result of formal financial market participation
by the respondents and is statistically significant at 1%. These
results support the findings of [9]t h a tf a r m e r si nK e n y aw h o
participated in microfinance programme had significantly
higher productive income which can be attributed to higher
input usage.
With regard to kernel-based matching algorithm, each
participant is matched with a weighted average of all non-
participants with weights that are inversely proportional to
the distance between the propensity score of the participants
and nonparticipants. In this study, we used a smoothening
p a r a m e t e ro f0 . 0 6 .Th ee ff e c to ff o r m a lfi n a n c i a lm a r k e t
participationonfarmsizeandexpenditureonvariableinputs
per hectare shows an increase of 0.41 hectare and GHć82.58,
respectively. However, only expenditure on variable inputs
is statistically significant at 1% level of significance. All the
matching techniques produce consistent estimates of the
effect of formal financial market participation on farm size
and expenditure on variable inputs.
Table 4 presents results from covariate balancing tests
before and after matching which gives an indication of
m a t c h i n gq u a l i t y .Th er e s u l t ss h o ws u b s t a n t i a lr e d u c t i o ni n
absolute bias for all the outcome variables for the three
matching algorithms. As indicated in Table 3,t h em e a n
bias after matching lies below the 20% level suggested by
[11].ISRN Economics 7
Table2:Logitmodeltopredicttheprobabilityofparticipatinginformalfinancialmarketconditionalonselectedobservablescharacteristics.
Dependent variable: participation or access to formal financial services (𝑌=1 ).
Covariates Odds Ratio Marginal Effect
GEN gender of respondents 1.3387 0.0709
YEDU years of schooling 1.0742
∗∗∗ 0.0172
VALPUT previous year’s maize income 1.0285
∗∗ 0.0183
TASET total asset 1.0003
∗∗ 0.0007
OATIV engaged in off-farm income generating
activities
1.5863
∗∗ 0.1125
ACOM level of maize commercialisation 2.0473
∗∗∗ 0.1757
PROXI proximity to financial institution −2.2250
∗∗∗ −0.1799
OPMO operational modalities 7.1746
∗∗∗ 0.3791
FSIZE farm size 2.0214
∗∗ 0.1256
Number of obs = 577
LR 𝜒
2 (14) = 168.41
Prob >𝜒
2 = 0.0000
Pseudo 𝑅
2 = 0.2114
∗
𝑃<0 . 1 ; ∗∗𝑃 < 0.05; ∗∗∗𝑃 < 0.01.
Table 3: Estimated impact of formal financial market participation on farm size and expenditure on variable inputs per hectare.
(a) Nearest neighbour matching (NNM)
Outcomes Average treatment
effect (ATE)
Average treatment
effect on untreated
(ATU)
Average treatment
effect on the treated
(ATT)
Farm size 5.993 5.882 0.111 (0.21)
Expenditure on variable inputs 190.826 105.642 85.184
∗∗∗ (4.93)
No. of observations 218 180
(b) Radius matching (RM) with a calliper of 0.01
Outcomes Average treatment
effect (ATE)
Average treatment
effect on untreated
(ATU)
Average treatment
effect on the treated
(ATT)
Farm size 6.0584 5.143 0.985 (0.66)
Expenditure on variable inputs 192.519 113.095 79.423
∗∗∗ (3.17)
No. of observations 190 174
(c) Kernel-based matching (KBM) using smoothening parameter of 0.06
Outcomes Average treatment
effect (ATE)
Average treatment
effect on untreated
(ATU)
Average treatment
effect on the treated
(ATT)
Farm size 6.127 5.721 0.406 (0.65)
Expenditure on variable inputs 192.083 109.502 82.581
∗∗∗ (3.02)
No. Of observations 227 190
𝑡-statistics are in parenthesis.
Source: own calculations.
∗∗∗𝑃 < 0.01.
This indicates that the variables were significantly bal-
anced as a result of the propensity score matching procedure.
In addition, the pseudo-R
2s after matching are fairly low
with none of the F-statistics being significantly different
from zero, suggesting that the proposed specification of the
propensity score is fairly successful in terms of balancing the
distribution of covariates between the two participants and
nonparticipants [17].
Furthermore, following [18] the sensitivity of significance
levels were examined. Here, several values of e
𝗾 bounds are
calculated on the significance level, and the null hypotheses
of no effect of participation on potential outcomes, farm8 ISRN Economics
Table 4: Indicators of matching quality before and after matching.
Matching
algorithm
Outcome
indicator
𝑅
2
unmatched
𝑅
2
matched
𝑃 value
unmatched
𝑃 value
matched
Mean absolute
bias
unmatched
Mean
absolute
bias matched
Absolute bias
reduction
Nearest
neighbour
Farm size 0.209 0.021 0.000 0.399 21.6 7.6 64.7
Expenditure on
variable inputs
per hectare
0.209 0.020 0.000 0.308 8.2 12.1 47.8
Calliper
Farm size 0.209 0.017 0.000 0.555 21.6 5.8 73.0
Expenditure on
variable inputs
per hectare
0.209 0.018 0.000 0.456 8.2 11.6 40.8
Kernel base
matching
Farm size 0.213 0.026 0.000 0.268 21.6 5.6 73.0
Expenditure on
variable inputs
per hectare
0.209 0.020 0.000 0.308 8.2 12.1 47.5
Source: author’s calculations.
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis with Rosenbaum’s bounds on probability values on farm size and expenditure on variable inputs.
Upper bounds on the significance level for different values of e
𝗾
e
𝗾 = 1.25 e
𝗾 = 1.5 e
𝗾 = 1.75 e
𝗾 =2
Using the single closest neighbour
Farm size 0.0001 0.0072 0.0871 0.327 0.6324
Expenditure on variable inputs <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0018 0.0211 0.1009
Using all neighbours within a calliper of 0.01
Farm size 0.0005 0.0255 0.1884 0.505 0.785
Expenditure on variable inputs <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0015 0.0171 0.0832
Using a biweight kernel function and a smoothing parameter of 0.06
Farm size 0.0001 0.012 0.1254 0.4131 0.7202
Expenditure on variable inputs <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0001 0.003 0.023
Source: author’s calculations.
size, and expenditure on variable inputs tested, respectively,
using the three introduced matching algorithms. Table 5
presents the result of the sensitivity analysis on farm size and
expenditure on variable inputs.
Overall, robustness of the results produced by Rosen-
baum’s bounds are quite similar. Kernel-based matching
produces the most robust treatment effect estimates with
respecttohiddenbiasespeciallyinthecaseofexpenditureon
variable inputs. Matched pairs might differ (e
𝗾 =2 )i nu n o b -
servable characteristics, while the impact of participation on
expenditure on variable inputs would be still significant at a
level of 5%.
The same expenditure on variable inputs is robust to
hidden bias up to an influence of e
𝗾 =2 at a significance
levelof10%followingtheradiusmatchingapproach.Alsothe
nearest neighbour matching is robust to selection bias unob-
servablecharacteristicsuptoanimpactlevelofe
𝗾 = 1.75and
e
𝗾 =2 , respectively. The estimated treatment effects on farm
size are sensitive to hidden bias, at a smaller unobservable
impact level of e
𝗾 = 1.5. Nevertheless, it has to be considered
that these sensitivity results are worst-case scenarios, even
though they indicate information about uncertainty within
the matching estimators of treatment effects [18].
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications
Theresultsfromthelogitmodelindicatethatfarmers’socioe-
conomic characteristics such as education, previous year’s
maize income, engagement in off-farm income generating
activities, and farm size significantly influence their formal
financial market participation positively. Thus improvement
in the farmers’ income levels through off-farm income gen-
erating activities and stable producer prices for maize would
encourage farmers’ participation in formal financial market
or use of formal financial services.
Governmental and Nongovernmental Organisations that
work to empower farmers’ livelihood should train the
farmers in off-farm income generating activities. This will
encourage farmers’ participation in formal financial market.
Farm income improvement policy in terms of adequate
remunerations for farmers (stable producer prices) is also
an important policy option for increasing formal financial
market participation.
Also, farm size expansion and a maize commercialisation
policy will improve farmers’ participation in financial ser-
vices.Furthermore,availabilityofformalfinancialinstitution
and use of friendly operational modalities will improve for-
mal financial market participation by farmers. Thus, formalISRN Economics 9
financial institutions should adapt their savings and lending
modalities to the needs of the farmers (i.e., making it less
cumbersome).
Th er e s u l t so ft h eP S Ma n a l y s i ss h o w e dt h a tf a r m e r s
who participated in the formal financial market tended to
spend more on variable inputs than nonparticipants. They
also had higher farm sizes as compared with nonpartici-
pants (albeit not statistically significant). Therefore, formal
financialmarketparticipationshouldbeencouragedthrough
education and promotional programmes by formal financial
institutions.
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